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IMPEACHMENT AND PRESIDENTIAL
IMMUNITY

FROM JUDICIAL PROCESS
JOSEPH ISENBERGH*
Possible impeachment of a President surfaced last
summer, for the first time since President Nixon's
resignation in 1974. The possibility emerged-nearly out of the blue-from judicial proceedings in
which President Clinton was a party. Two constitutional questions running through these events-the
scope of impeachment and the exposure of a sitting
President to compulsory judicial process-received
extensive scrutiny during the Watergate affair. From
that misadventure survives a body of conventional
academic wisdom and specific legal precedent on
both questions. On impeachment the academic
consensus is that impeachable offenses are defined
in the Constitution as "treason, bribery, or other
high crimes and misdemeanors," the latter terms
describing a somewhat nebulous category of serious
offenses. The President's exposure to compulsory
judicial process, meanwhile, was established definitively in United States v. Nixon.'
The current imbroglio, therefore, is unfolding
under ground rules shaped in the previous episode
involving misconduct by a President. In my view, all
the essential constitutional elements at issue in
these events are misconceived by the participants
and most academic commentators. The prevailing
conventional wisdom on impeachment and presidential immunity slights both the terms of the
Constitution and history. The scope of impeachment, based on a straightforward, indeed unequivocal, reading of the constitutional provisions concerning it, is demonstrably different from the academic consensus. And, when impeachment is correctly understood, the question of the President's immunity from judicial process takes on a different light.
It is not a new light, however. Everything that I present here about impeachment and presidential
*Seymour Logan Professor of Law, University of Chicago. David
Currie has been most helpful in sharpening my focus on historical
sources.

'418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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immunity is derived from the text of the
Constitution and history contemporaneous with its
drafting. I propose, in other words, to exhume the
original meaning of the Constitution on these questions.
Although my immediate purpose is to establish
the meaning of several constitutional provisions
from their language and history, the constitutional
scheme of impeachment and presidential immunity
that emerges from this exercise, adventitiously perhaps, is far preferable to the grotesque muddle
through which we currently suffer. Judged either by
fidelity to the original understanding embodied in
the text of the Constitution or just good sense, the
view of impeachment and presidential immunity
that I expound here is better than what prevails
today.
As much of the world is aware, the affair currently
slouching through Washington originated in the
courts. President Clinton gave a deposition in a civil
lawsuit orchestrated by political opponents, having
failed to win deferral of that suit on grounds of presidential immunity.2 The lawsuit was later dismissed as
meritless. In the course of his deposition the
President denied a sexual relationship in a setting
quite apart from the lawsuit. True or false, the
President's denial is unremarkable. A civilized person is not supposed to kiss and tell. The rest I am
sure the reader knows. But if not, it is enough to say
here that this misadventure, from its beginnings as a
third-rate lawsuit through its recent referral by the
special prosecutor for possible impeachment, has
taken on a life of its own in the courts, the media,
and Congress.
Although Americans, and especially legal academic folk, take for granted an imperial judiciary, in
most of the world the role of the courts in this affair
is unfathomable, even shocking. The exposure of a
sitting chief of state to lawsuits, and to compulsory
judicial process generally, is almost unheard of outside the United States. As far as I know, it might
happen in a theocratic state with an official religion
and religious courts, but nowhere else. In discussions
with their European counterparts American lawyers
sometimes try to put a good face on this affair,
2

CIinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
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despite appearances, as demonstrating that in a
democracy no one, including the chief of state, is
above the law. A good number of those holding out
this pablum, I suspect, know in their hearts that it is
nonsense-that the proceedings involving President
Clinton are demented. It is utterly grotesque to have
a sitting President tangled up in the courts over
what is at worst, or best, an histoire de couchage.
The stage was set for these events-and the irony
is palpable-in a Supreme Court decision of the
Watergate era, United States v. Nixon,4 holding
that a sitting President is subject to compulsory judicial process. In its day-1974-United States v.
Nixon was widely admired as a pathbreaking decision. The question there had not before been directly resolved by a U.S. court.' The detractors of
United States v. Nixon-and they were fewthought that in the constitutional scheme the
President is not subject to a direct judicial command. Impeachment, some argued, was the only way
another part of the government could act against a
President in office. To this the proponents of United
States v. Nixon, who were overwhelmingly more
numerous, answered that impeachment would often
be both insufficient and inapposite. Insufficient,
because much misconduct and legal obligation were
beyond the reach of impeachment. Inapposite,
because impeachment can degenerate into a political circus. Filtered through the courts, by contrast, a
case involving the President will receive impartial
scrutiny.
These views are wrong in almost all basic respects.
To back up this contention, I propose to analyze the
3I have overheard a number of such conversations in recent weeks at
various conferences in Europe, and even on airplanes to and from
such.

'418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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The inference has been drawn--erroneously I believe-from the proceedings involving the Burr conspiracy of 1807 that the President is
subject to compulsory judicial process. The events in that case establish no such thing. Justice Marshall issued a request to produce a letter
held by President Jefferson. Jefferson, who had already turned the letter over to the Attorney General, asked District Attorney George Hay
"voluntarily" to make it available in the proceedings. See David
Currie, The President's Evidence [publication pending]. Currie infers
from the proceedings a concession by Justice Marshall of an important
measure of presidential immunity. In any event, the Burr proceedings
did not go beyond the issuance of a request by a court. The real test of
presidential immunity-the consequences of a refusal by the President
to respond to a subpoena-was not reached in the Burr case, and lay
in abeyance until United States v. Nixon.
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constitutional provisions on impeachment and their
bearing on presidential immunity. In the process, I
shall attempt to get as close as possible to the original meaning of the Constitution on these matters.
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY
At the outset, there is no smoking gun in the
Constitution on the question of presidential immunity-that is, no provision explicitly shielding the
President from compulsory judicial process, or the
contrary. The closer we get to the original understanding of the Constitution, however, the more
likely it seems that a sitting President is not subject
to compulsory judicial process, but only to impeachment. A useful starting point is Joseph Story's
Commentaries, in which he wrote that because the
President's "incidental powers" must include "the
power to perform [his duties], without any obstruction," the President "cannot ... be liable to arrest,

imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this purpose
his person must be deemed, in civil cases at least, to
possess an official inviolability."6 The fair import of
this comment, I believe, is that the President personally is beyond the reach of the courts and, in civil
cases, beyond the reach of any official action,
including impeachment. Echoing and extending
Story's comment, an 1838 Supreme Court decision,
Kendall v. United States, states as though a self-evident and eternal verity that
The executive power is vested in a President; and
as far as his powers are derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the impeaching power." 7
In both Story's Commentaries and Kendall appears a
common understanding that the President is not
subject to compulsory judicial process. Together the
import of these excerpts is stronger than either separately. In the Kendall dictum standing alone the
words "as far as his powers are derived from the con63

J.Story, Commentaries on the Constitution

418-419 (1833).
Fpp.

37 U.S. (12 Peters) 524, 609 (1838).
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of the United States §1563,

stitution" could be construed as limiting its focus to

presidential immunity for official acts.' Story's comment, however, extends inviolability to the
President's person in civil cases. Indeed, in light of
Story's comment, the apposed words in Kendall can
just as easily be understood to mean "as possessor of
the executive power under the Constitution" and
refer to presidential immunity as broadly as Story
does.9 Either way, the thrust of both comments cuts
only in the direction of presidential immunity.
Long before Kendall, where the President's immunity from judicial process is expressly understood as a
corollary of his exposure to impeachment, the
framers of the Constitution had understood a fundamental relation between presidential immunity and
impeachment. For them presidential immunity was
the premise of the constitutional provisions on
impeachment.
There was no hint at the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 that the President would ever
be subject to judicial command, and not a few implications of the contrary. Moving to closer range, the
President's immunity from judicial command is the
apparent premise of the extended debate on
impeachment of July 20, 1787. There, impeachment
was understood on all sides as the only way to reach
misconduct by the President. Several proponents of
the impeachment power urged that, without it, the
President would be above the law. George Mason
urged: "No point is of more importance than that
the right of impeachment should be continued.
Shall any man be above Justice? . . . When great
crimes were committed he was for punishing the
principal as well as the Coadjutors.""o Elbridge Gerry
"urged the necessity of impeachments," and "hoped
that the maxim would never be adopted here that
the chief Magistrate could do <no> wrong."" For
Edmund Randolph "[tihe propriety of impeachments
was a favorite principle ... . Should no regular pun-

so construed the Kendall dictum does not, of course, deny presi.
dential immunity from judicial process for private acts. It is merely
silent on the question.
9
justice Story was on the Supreme Court at the time of Kendall v.
United States, and participated in the decision.
[02 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 65
(rev. ed. 1937) [hereafter cited as Farrand].
"Id. at 66.
8Even
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ishment be provided, it will be irregularly inflicted
by tumults and insurrections."2 Randolph was echoing a similar point of Benjamin Franklin's:
What was the practice before this in cases where
the chief Magistrate rendered himself obnoxious?
Why recourse was had to assassination in [which]
he was not only deprived of his life but of the
opportunity of vindicating his character. It [would]
be the best way therefore to provide in the
Constitution for the regular punishment of the
Executive when his misconduct should deserve it,
and for his honorable acquittal when he should be
unjustly accused."
Gouverneur Morris, who opposed a broad impeachment power, had previously argued that there was no
need for presidential impeachment because "[The

President] can do no criminal act without
Coadjutors who may be punished."" Morris's remark,
as does Mason's responding to it," assumes that the

President himself is beyond the reach of the courts.
Otherwise, both the President and his "coadjutors"
could be punished. Indeed, the entire discussion of
July 20 is meaningless if the President is otherwise

subject to judicial power.
In the ensuing two centuries this understanding of
presidential immunity lost its mooring, having given
way at some point to the notion that a President
subject only to impeachment would be in some manner above the law. The precise extent of the
President's exposure to judicial process today is far
from clear. Joseph Story's view that a President in
office cannot be indicted, arrested, or imprisoned
apparently still holds." But United States v. Nixon
"ld. at 67.
"ld. at 65.
4
' Id. at 64.
5
1 See p.5 above.
6
1 At this stage of the deliberations, furthermore, the trier of impeachments was not settled and could still have been the Supreme Court,
upon an accusation brought by the House of Representatives. This
makes it even less plausible that the President could be subject to
judicial power in any other way.
7
Special prosecutor Starr sent his report on the grand jury to
Congress, for possible impeachment, and did not proceed in court
The Independent Counsel statute, to be sure, instructs the special
prosecutor to report possible impeachable offenses to Congress, but
does not bar proceedings directly against the President. 28 USC
8595(c) ("An independent counsel shall advise the House of
Representatives of any substantial and credible information which
such independent counsel receives, in carrying out the independent
counsel's responsibilities under this chapter, that may constitute
grounds for an impeachment.").
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clearly holds the President subject personally to
compulsory process in criminal proceedings, while
Clinton v. Jones holds him subject to private civil
lawsuits, and the attendant compulsory process, for
nonofficial acts. Clinton v. Jones also brings its own
new formulation of the respective spheres of
impeachment and judicial action concerning misconduct, obligations, and liabilities of the President.
To the Supreme Court's generalized pronouncement
in United States v. Nixon ("We therefore reaffirm
that it is the province and duty of this Court 'to say
what the law is' with respect to the claim of privilege
presented in this case."") Clinton v. Jones adds the
more fully articulated proposition that "[wlith
respect to acts taken in his 'public character'-that
is official acts-the President may be disciplined
principally by impeachment, not by private lawsuits
for damages ... [b]ut he is otherwise subject to the

laws for his purely private acts.""
Closer scrutiny of the Court's encapsulation
brings out the full incoherence of present law. On its
face, the Court's statement does not excludeindeed invites-possible arrest or indictment of a
President for such "purely private acts" as crimes
directed at private persons." That is, inescapably,
what it means to be "subject to the laws" for "purely
private acts." Murder of a private person, or shoplifting, are not official acts, and being "subject to the
laws" (unless the Court is following the semantic
usage of H. Dumpty21 ) means possible arrest, indictment, and trial. If, on the other hand, the Court did
not mean what it manifestly said-and it still holds
true that the President is not subject to arrest,
indictment, or imprisonment-then a President can
be sued in tort but not arrested or indicted for murder. And while you are asking yourself how weird is
that, consider as well, in such a patchwork regime of
presidential immunity, how exactly a President can
be subject to civil suit? Suppose the President just
says no, and ignores the suit. Jail for contempt, by
hypothesis, is out of the question. Therefore
"s418 U.S. at 705.
19520 U.S. at-. Does "principally" imply some "minor" exposure to
judicial process for official acts?
0
There is a similar implication in the Court's pronouncement that "if
the federal judiciary may ... direct appropriate process to the President
himself, it must follow that the federal courts have power to deter.
mine the legality of his unofficial conduct." Id. at
21
See Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass (Signet ed. 1960) at
186 ("'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said ... 'it means just
what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less.").
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impeachment becomes the backstop of civil suits
against the President.
The view of presidential immunity implicit in
Clinton v. Jones, when pressed, thus defies reason as
well as the available inferences from history.
For many, of course, fidelity to historical meaning
is not the sole, or even major concern. Most do,
however, want a constitutional scheme that makes
good day-to-day sense. In that regard, the urgency of
leaving a President exposed to compulsory judicial
process depends importantly on the scope of
impeachment, as even the Supreme Court appears to
understand in Clinton v. Jones. If in impeachment
we find an instrument sufficient to protect the public at all events against misconduct by the President,
then United States v. Nixon and Clinton v. Jones
lose considerable force. An essential step, therefore,
in thinking through the question of presidential
immunity is to bring the scope of impeachment into
the sharpest possible focus.
THE SCOPE OF IMPEACHMENT
On this score I have good news. A close reading
of the constitutional provisions on impeachment
brings a remarkably clear-indeed nearly unequivocal-understanding of the scope of impeachment.
And to find it, one need only look closely at the
words of the Constitution.
The reader, quite possibly, will react skeptically to
this claim. Commentators on impeachment find
great uncertainty in the constitutional provisions
and relevant history, and differ widely among themselves.22 If there were a clear meaning to be found,
wouldn't they know about it? Surely, you may think,
scholars have pored over the constitutional provisions on impeachment, especially scholars commenting on the current proceedings. How else would one
find out the scope of impeachment? Think again.

22

A view also surfacing among commentators is that the impeachment
provisions, reflecting the political nature of the process, cannot be
clearly apprehended. See Michael Gerhardt, The Constitutional
Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 5
(1989) ("[The impeachment clauses ... virtually defy systematic
analysis precisely because impeachment is by nature, structure, and
design an essentially political process.").
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American lawyers, including constitutional scholars,
do not habitually refer to, or even read, the text of
the Constitution. Some find that it distracts them
from their main concerns."
To confirm this, I suggest the following experiment. Ask an American constitutional scholar (not
just any lawyer) about the constitutional provisions
on impeachment. The answer will be something
like: "Well, the constitution defines impeachable
offenses as treason, bribery, and high crimes and misdemeanors."24 You might also get an outline of the
procedure of impeachment. This understanding of
impeachment is so widespread that the words "high
crimes and misdemeanors" have come to be synonymous in common discourse with "impeachable
offenses."" A similar understanding can be found in
most of the recent scholarly writing on the subject."6
Now lets see what the Constitution actually says
about impeachment. This will come as a surprise to
many readers, including some whose profession is
thinking about the Constitution. A close reading of
the Constitution, coupled with some exploration of
relevant history, reveals that 1) impeachable offenses are not defined in the Constitution, 2) "high
crimes and misdemeanors" are an historically welldefined category of offenses aimed specifically
against the state, for which removal from office is
mandatory upon conviction by the Senate, 3)
Congress has the power to impeach and remove civil
officers for a range of offenses other than high crimes
and misdemeanors, and 4) the Senate can impose
sanctions less severe than removal from office-censure, for example-on civil officers convicted of
such other offenses.

23

When I outlined the analysis of impeachment presented here to a

leading constitutional scholar, the response was, "You're just talking
to me about words. I don't care about that."
24
This experiment is more likely to work, perhaps, on someone who
hasn't read this article, but that does not eliminate very many subiects.
See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, What Ken Starr Neglected to tell Us,
New York Times, September 14, 1998. (asserting "high crimes and
misdemeanors" as the constitutional "test" of impeachment).
26
See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Impeachment: the Constitutional Problems
(1973) [hereafter cited as Berger]; Irving Brant, Impeachment (1972)
[hereafter cited as Brant]. But see The Scope of the Power to
Impeach, 84 Yale L. J. 1316 (1975) (student note by Joseph
Isenbergh).
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Article II, Section 4
The most widely cited provision on impeachment
in the Constitution is Article II, section 4, which
reads:
The President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from
Office on Impeachment for and conviction of
Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and
Misdemeanors.
These words do not define impeachable offenses.
They are neither literally nor by inference a definition. Rather, they require that a President and others, if convicted upon impeachment of various serious offenses, be removed from office. "Shall be
removed" is a command, not a definition.27 Placed at
the end of Article II, this clause says peremptorily
that if the President and others are convicted of certain bad acts, Congress must throw them out.
Article II, section 4, in short, is a mandatory sentencing provision.
Although it enumerates several impeachable
offenses, nothing in Article II, section 4 indicates
that it is an exhaustive listing. That civil officers must
be removed for "treason, bribery, or other high
crimes and misdemeanors," does not preclude the
existence of other misconduct for which they may be
impeached and removed. For Article II, section 4, to
be an exhaustive listing, "shall be removed for" must
be taken as somehow equivalent to "shall be
removed only for." When the drafters of the
Constitution wanted to give a restrictive definition,
however, they knew how to do so unambiguously, as
in their definition of treason in Article Ill, section
3." One has to work quite hard against the text to
find in Article II, section 4, a definition of all
""Shall" has imperative force everywhere in the Constitution when it
occurs in an independent clause. Every command in the Constitution
is couched in terms of "shall." See, e.g., Martin v, Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 328-33 (1816). There were exchanges at the
Federal Convention confirming that the framers attached imperative
force to "shall." See 2 Farrand at 377, 412-13.
28
"Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying
War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid
and Comfort." Note the word "only." State constitutions before 1787,
furthermore, all contain straightforward definitions of impeachable
offenses, not provisions for mandatory removal. See p.22 below.
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impeachable offenses rather than a specification of
those offenses for which removal from office is
mandatory upon conviction.
This reading of Article II, section 4, is systematically confirmed in other provisions on impeachment
in the Constitution. The impeachment power is
granted to Congress in Article 1:
The House of Representatives ... shall have the
sole Power of Impeachment."
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all

Impeachments.30
The term "Impeachment" appears in these provisions without explanation, as though well-understood. Terms so used in the Constitution were taken
in 1787 (and sometimes even today) in their established sense. 3 1 Impeachable offenses both in England
and America had included a broad range of misconduct other than "high crimes and misdemeanors.""
Thus if Article II, section 4, is to be taken, against
its words, as an exhaustive listing of impeachable
offenses, it also represents a sharp break with earlier
practice. Had the framers intended such a break,
they could have accomplished it more clearly than
by commanding removal for high crimes and misdemeanors in Article II after providing a general grant
of the power to impeach in Article 1.
Beyond these generalities, there is more specific
confirmation of this reading of Article II, section 4,
in Article 1, section 3:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend

further than to removal from Office and disqualification to hold or enjoy an Office of honor, Trust, or
Profit under the United States.33
29

Article 1, section 2.
0
3 Article 1, section 3.
3
'in 1807, Chief Justice Marshall wrote of another such phrase, "levying war": "It is scarcely conceivable that the term was not employed
by the framers of Our constitution in the sense which had been
affixed to it by those from whom we borrowed it." United States v.
Burr 25 F. Cas. 55, 159 (No. 14,693) (C.C.D. Va. 1807). See also Ex
parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925). Justice Frankfurter
wrote: "Words of art bring their art with them. They bear the meaning of their habitat : ... ." Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the
Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 537 (1947).
32
See pp. 19-22 below.
33(Emphasis added.)
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The limitation on the severity of judgments bears on
the scope of the impeachment power in several
ways. First, it confirms the drafters' ability to be
explicit when departing from English precedents.
Article 1, section 3, prohibits the more severe penalties allowed in England." Had the framers also wanted to provide for a narrower range of impeachable
offenses, they could have put a similar limitation in
the Article in which they granted to Congress the
powers of impeachment.
Second, the words "judgment ... shall not extend
further than to . . ." do allow judgments to extend
less far than removal and disqualification." It can
hardly have been beyond the framers' powers, had
they wanted to foreclose this possibility, to write
that the only judgments in cases of impeachment
shall be removal and disqualification. At least one
18th century lawyer was able to express that idea
unambiguously. Thomas Jefferson's 1783 draft of a
proposed constitution for Virginia contains the following: "[Aind the only sentence they shall have
authority to pass shall be that of deprivation and
future incapacity of office." 6
Third, and most importantly, Article 1, section 3,
undercuts any reading of Article II, section 4, as a
comprehensive statement of impeachable offenses.
With removal and disqualification the outer limits of
a range of judgments, the drafting of Article II, section 4-which commands only one of the extreme
judgments permitted in Article 1, section 3-would
34

As the framers were well aware, see Berger at 4 n.21, 30 n.107, 87
n.160, 122 n.4, 143 n.97, the English House of Lords had handed
down a wide variety of judgments in impeachment cases. Compare, for
example, the cases of Henry Sacheverell, 15 State Trials 1, 39, 474
(Howell 1710) (temporary suspension from preaching) and of
Theophilis Field, 2 State Trials 1087, 1118 (Howell 1620) (censure),
with the case of Lord Lovat, 18 State Trials 529, 838 (Howell 1746)
(hanging, drawing and quartering).
Among the penalties in impeachments acknowledged by Blackstone
are banishment, imprisonment, forfeiture of office, fines, perpetual disability, and "discretionary censure, regulated by the nature and aggravations of the offence committed." 4 William Blackstone,
Commentaries *121, *141 thereafter cited as Blackstone].
35
1t may be difficult in the case of fines and damages to determine
whether or not they are "lesser" judgments than removal and disqualification. Blackstone suggests that fines are lesser penalties than forfeiture of office. 4 Blackstone, *14041. In any event, there do exist judgments of the same nature as removal and disqualification that clearly
extend "less far," such as censure, enjoining misconduct, or temporary
suspension.
36
The Jeffersonian Cyclopedia 416 (J. Foley ed. 1967) (emphasis
added).
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be implausibly bad if it were the vehicle for defining
the entire range of impeachable offenses. It follows
that Article II, section 4, is no such thing. Rather,
Article II, section 4, lists a category of crimes for
which no lesser judgment than removal is possible.
There is further confirmation of this reading of
Article II, section 4, in the provision of Article III
for the tenure of judges, which is discussed below."
Once Article II, section 4, is understood, not as
defining the impeachment power or impeachable
offenses, but as requiring removal in certain cases,
two further questions arise. First, why does the
Constitution specifically require removal from office
upon conviction of "treason, bribery, or other high
crimes and misdemeanors"? Second, if not limited to
this enumerated type, what are impeachable offenses? Here too, the answer to both questions is surprisingly clear in light of the relevant history.
"High Crimes and Misdemeanors"
The core of the conventional view of impeachment-derived from an erroneous reading of Article
II, section 4, in my view-is that "treason, bribery,
or other high crimes and misdemeanors" make up
the constitutional standard of impeachable offenses.
The conventional understanding, however, offers no
clear notion of what "high crimes and misdemeanors" are. Commentators on impeachment differ
widely among themselves over what constitutes a
"high crime or misdemeanor." Having little focus on
the historical meaning of these words, writers tend
to choose a meaning consistent with their preferences concerning proceedings in view at the time of
their writing." Much writing on impeachment con2

p. 3 below.
Berger (writing after short-lived talk of impeaching Justice Douglas,
during which Representative Ford, later President Ford, said that an
impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House votes to find
as such) concludes that "high crimes and misdemeanors," and therefore impeachable offenses, amount to serious misconduct, but are not
limited to statutory crimes. See Berger at 53-102 (esp. 91-93). Brant
(also after the Douglas matter) concludes that "high crimes and misdemeanors" consist only of crimes indictable under federal law and
violations of oaths of office. See Brant at 23. During the Watergate
affair the staff of the House Judiciary Committee took a position close
to that of Berger. See Impeachment Inquiry Staff of House Comm.
On the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Constitutional Grounds for
Presidential Impeachment 1, 4 (Comm. Print 1974). President
Nixon's lawyers took a position very near that of Brant. See St. Clair,
An Analysis of the Constitutional Standard for Impeachment, in
Presidential Impeachment: A Documentary Overview 40-73 (M.
Schnapper ed. 1974).
3See
35
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sistently overlooks or misinterprets straightforward
historical indications of the scope of "high crimes
and misdemeanors" and impeachable offenses generally.39
A little digging into legal authorities well-known
in 1787 reveals what "high crimes and misdemeanors" are and why they are specifically stated
grounds of mandatory removal in Article II, section
4. The reason lies in the meaning of the word
"high." Without the word "high" attached to it, the
expression "crimes and misdemeanors" is nothing
more than a description of public wrongs, offenses
that are cognizable in some court of criminal jurisdiction. Blackstone, speaking of the criminal law,
begins: "We are now arrived at the fourth and last
branch of these commentaries, which treats of public
wrongs or crimes and misdemeanors . . . " and later

continues: "A crime or misdemeanor, is an act committed, or omitted, in violation of a public law,
either forbidding or commanding it."40

In the 18th Century the word "high," when
attached to the word "crime" or "misdemeanor,"
describes a crime aiming at the state or the sovereign
rather than a private person. A "high crime or misdemeanor" is not simply a serious crime, but one
aimed at the highest powers of the state. "High" has
denoted crimes against the state since the Middle
Ages."
This meaning of "high" was known to the lawyers

of 1787. Part III of Coke's Institutes-standard fare

39

But see Arthur Bestor, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems,
49 Wash. L. Rev. 255 (1973) (review of Berger).
44 Blackstone at *1, *5.
4t
The first appearance of the word "high" with this meaning in
impeachments may have been in the proceedings against Robert de
Vere and Michael de la Pole in 1386: "[1]t was declared that in so high
a crime as is alleged in this appeal, which touches the person of the king,
our Lord, and the state of his entire realm ... ." 3 Rotuli Parliamentorum
[Rolls of Parliament] 236 (undated) (emphasis added) (passage from
the rolls of Parliament for the years 1387-88, translated by the author
from the original French: "[estoit declare], Que en si haute crime
come est pretendu en cest Appell, q [quil touche la persone du Roi
fire [nostre] dit Sr [Seigneur], & I'estat de tout son Roialme .... "

14

for lawyers of the 18th century42-begins with a
chapter on high treason, followed by a chapter on
petit treason, the first sentence of which demonstrates that for Coke "high" meant "against the sovereign": "It was called high or grand treason in
respect of the royall majesty against whom it is committed, and comparatively it is called petit treason ...
in respect it is committed against subjects and inferior persons ... ." Blackstone reasserts this meaning of

"high,"" describing various "misprisions" and "contempts ... immediately against the king and

government" as "all such high offences as are under
the degree of capital."" This establishes both the
nature of "high" offenses and the difference between
them and serious (i.e. "capital") crimes generally.4 6
The form of the phrase "treason, bribery, or other high
crimes and misdemeanors" in Article II, section 4,
indicates that "treason" and "bribery" are also "high"

42See, e.g., 10 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 376 (P. Ford ed.
1899); William Koch, Reopening Tennessee's Open Courts Clause: A
Historical Reconsideration of Article 1, Section 17 of the Tennessee
Constitution, 27 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 333, 348, 361, 363 (1997);
Robert Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1991 1990 Wis L. Rev. 941,
958, 992-995 (1990); Christopher Vizas, Law and Political Expression
in the American Revolution, Feb. 1975 (unpublished paper on file
with Yale Law Journal) (thorough survey of Coke's stature in colonial
America).
4'3 Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England; Concerning High
Treason and Other Pleas of the Crown 19 (1817).
44
Blackstone continues Coke's classification of treason as "high" and
"petit." 4 Blackstone at *75. Like Coke, Blackstone was widely known
in colonial America. See, e.g., 3 Jonathan Elliot, Debates in the Several
State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 501 (1836)
(remark by James Madison regarding Blackstone) [hereafter cited as
Elliot]; Robert Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1991 1990 Wis L.
Rev. 941, 992-995 (1990).
45
1d. at *119. (Emphasis added.) Blackstone's enumeration of "high
misdemeanors" under this heading includes "maladministration,"
embezzlement of public money, various misprisions "against the king
and government," and violence or threats of violence against a judge.
Id. at *121-26. Blackstone also lists endeavoring "to dissuade a witness against giving evidence." Id. at 126. In case you were wondering,
this appears to consist of trying to keep a witness from appearing at all
rather than suggesting false testimony.
Please note, further, that I do not mean to suggest that "high crimes
and misdemeanors" should be taken as congruent with offenses identified as "high" by Blackstone, but simply that the import of the term
"high" attached to crimes is clear in Blackstone's Commentaries.
"There is also a difference between "high" crimes and crimes "against
the King's peace," the latter words being a necessary incantation to
bring any offense within the jurisdiction of the King's courts. I
Blackstone at *118, *268, *350; 4 Blackstone at *444 (appendix).
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crimes. The definition of treason in the
Constitution" is taken verbatim from Blackstone's
definition of "high" treason." Thus the first enumerated crime in Article II, section 4, is unequivocally a
"high" crime. Bribery of a public official was also a
crime against the state at common law, being limited to the making or taking of payments to influence
the course of justice. 9
"High crimes and misdemeanors" thus refer to
crimes that harm the state in an immediate way and
impair its functioning. Examples of high crimes
include treason, bribery, espionage, obstruction of
justice in federal criminal proceedings, sabotage of
government property, and embezzling or stealing
from the public treasury.
The proceedings of the 1787 Constitutional
Convention establish to near-certainty this understanding of "high crimes and misdemeanors" among
the framers. The Convention originally adopted the
expression "high crimes and misdemeanors against
the State.""o The words "against the State" were subsequently deleted from this clause, being first
replaced by "against the United States" in order "to
remove ambiguity."" The words "against the United
States" were then removed without explanation by
the Committee of Style.52 The Committee of Style,
unlike other committees of the Convention, was not
authorized to make any changes in meaning." This
allows the strong inference that the drafters considered the words "against the United States" redundant in this clause. Further underscoring this understanding, Representative Lawrence of New York,
speaking in the First Congress, referred to Article II,
section 4, of the Constitution as preventing the
retention in office of persons "guilty of crimes or
misdemeanors against the Government.""
47

Article Ill, section 3 ("Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies,
living them Aid and Comfort.").
84 Blackstone at *81-82.
49
Id. at * 139.
so2 Farrand at 550 (emphasis added).
"Id. at 551. The "state" in question in federal impeachments is of
course the United States.
52
1d. at 575, 600.
5
3ld. at 553; cf. 3 id. at 499.
54
I Annals of Congress 392-93 (1789) (running head: "Gales &
Seaton's History of Debates in Congress").
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There is also evidence from the Constitutional
Convention that the framers did not consider "high
misdemeanors" to be a grab-bag of unspecified
offenses, but crimes directed at the state. When a
draft provision for extradition by the states of "any
person charged with treason, felony or high misdemeanor" was considered, the words "high misdemeanor" were replaced with "other crime," (as
Article IV, section 2, now reads) because it was
"doubtful whether 'high misdemeanor' had not a
technical meaning too limited."" In the debate of
August 20 on treason, which is held out as "an
offence against the Sovereignty"" there is a particularly telling observation of Rufus King, who points
out that the definition of treason "excludes any treason against particular States,"" adding that "[t]hese
may however punish offences" against them "as high
misdemesnors."58

This meaning of "high" explains why Article II,
section 4, requires removal for "high crimes and misdemeanors." It bars the retention in office of civil
officers convicted of wrongdoing that harms the
state itself. Because it does not concern itself with
wrongdoing that strikes elsewhere, however, Article
II, section 4, is not plausible as a comprehensive definition of impeachable offenses.59 Any number of the
most serious crimes-murder, bank robbery, rapeare not "high" crimes.' Article II, section 4, does
not prevent impeachment and removal for such
crimes. It simply does not require removal upon conviction. The conventional reading of Article II, section 4, by contrast, leaves the Congress without
recourse against a President in office who has com52

Farrand at 443.

562 Farrand at 346 (remark of Johnson).

sThis is so because the definition of treason in the Constitution is
limited to treason against the United States.
"ld. at 348.
59Even if it were conceivable to leave a President who had committed
other crimes (such as murder) beyond the reach of impeachment-on
the ground, for example, that only harm to the state warrants
removal-it is unimaginable to do the same for federal judges. See p.
24 below.
6One commentator gives murder and rape as "manifest grounds of
removal for high crimes." Brant, note 24 above, at 43. In this Brant
appears to equate "high" with "serious." But neither murder nor rape
were "high" crimes at common law (unless directed at the sovereign).
Given this, Brant's observation (albeit unwittingly) demolishes the
conventional reading of the impeachment provisions in the
Constitution.
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mitted these crimes and, until the passage of the
25th Amendment in 1967, would have left the
nation without recourse against a President's incapacity or madness.6'
The Range of Impeachable Offenses
Given the meaning of "high" crimes, Article II,
section 4-which by its terms does not prevent
impeachment for other misconduct-cannot reasonably describe the full range of impeachable offenses.
This raises the inevitable next question: what is
impeachment for? Here also there is an answer in
the text of the Constitution and the relevant history.
Impeachment is for crimes. It is, simply, a form of
criminal process conducted in Congress. There is an
immediate indication of the character of impeachment in Article III, section 2: "The Trial of all
Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by
Jury ... ." This clause, by the qualifying words
"except in Cases of Impeachment" places impeachment squarely in the family of criminal proceedings.
Similarly, the President's power in Article II, section
2, to grant reprieves and pardons does not apply "in
Cases of Impeachment." Further underscoring the
nature of impeachment as a criminal process is the
provision in Article I, section 3, that the "party convicted" in an impeachment trial remains liable to
indictment and trial at law. No exception to the
principles of double jeopardy would be necessary if
impeachment were not a criminal process.
These textual indications gain considerable force
from the history of impeachment in England and
America. The framers adopted the impeachment
power against a well-known common law background of English and American practice. Indeed,
there was an impeachment actually under way in
England at the time of the Federal Convention.6 2
From the history of impeachment before 1787 it is
possible to reconstruct the general understanding of
impeachment that an American lawyer would have
had in 1787. Impeachment emerges from this exercise as a common law criminal process, an area of
61

25

See also p. below.
The impeachment of Warren Hastings. See the remarks of George
2
Mason at the Constitutional Convention, p. 9 below.
62
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jurisdiction with some power to shape itself, but also
governed by precedent.
Throughout its history in England and America,
impeachment was concerned with crimes.
Blackstone described impeachment as "a presentment to the most high and supreme court of criminal jurisdiction by the most solemn grand inquest of
the whole kingdom."' To say that impeachment lies
for crimes, however, is only a starting point of analysis and does not mean that an impeachable crime
was a statutory crime or an indictable crime triable
in the King's courts. Impeachment was a criminal
process with its own body of precedent. Because the
jurisdiction of Parliament as a court of impeachment
was separate, it was not bound by the precedents of
the King's courts. Impeachable offenses within the
jurisdiction of Parliament were governed only by the
law of Parliament."4 Blackstone allowed that
impeachable crimes were something of a class apart:
For, though in general the union of the legislative
and judicial powers ought to be more carefully
avoided, yet it may happen that a subject entrusted
with the administration of public affairs may
infringe the rights of the people, and be guilty of
such crimes as the ordinary magistrate either dares
not or cannot punish. 6 5
This does not, however, change the fundamental
character of impeachment as a criminal process.
Indeed, Blackstone had also previously asserted that
an impeachment was the "prosecution of the already
known and established law ... "6
While undoubtedly a criminal process, impeachment was not limited specifically to "high crimes
and misdemeanors." Throughout its history in
England and America impeachment had extended
to other offenses.
In England there were, as one would expect,
Blackstone at *259.
4
6 See, e.g., Grantham v. Gordon, decided in 1719 by the Lords:
"[l]mpeachments in Parliament differed from indictments, and might
be justified by the law and course of Parliament." 24 Eng, Rep. 539,
541 (H.L. 1719).
54 Blackstone at *260-61. This idea is repeated almost exactly by
Wooddeson. 2 R. Wooddeson, A Systematical View of the Laws of
England 596 (1972) [hereafter cited as Wooddeson].
664 Blackstone at *259. This distinguishes impeachments from attainders. See id.
634
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impeachments for treason and corruption. But there
were also impeachments for other misconduct both
in and out of office."7 In 1681, the House of
Commons resolved:
That it is the undoubted right of the Commons, in
parliament assembled, to impeach before the Lords
in Parliament, any peer or Commoner for treason
or any other crime or misdemeanor."
Thomas Jefferson had precisely this understanding of
the English precedent. In his Manual of

Parliamentary Practice Jefferson wrote that the
Lords "may proceed against the delinquent, of whatsoever degree, and whatsoever be the nature of the
offence."69
In the entire body of impeachment cases and

commentary in England impeachable offenses are

67

Case of Lord Mordaunt, 6 State Trials 785, 790 (Howell 1660) (preventing another from standing for Parliament, and making uncivil
addresses to a young lady); Case of Chief Justice Scroggs, 8 State
Trials 163, 200 (Howell 1680) ("frequent and notorious excesses and
debaucheries"); 4 J. Hatsell, Precedents of the Proceedings in the
House of Commons 126 (1818) ("advising and assisting in the drawing and passing of 'A Proclamation Against Tumultuous Petitions');
Case of Peter Pett, 6 State Trials 865, 866-88 (Howell 1668) (negligent preparation before an enemy invasion, losing a ship through
carelessness, and sending the wrong type of planks to serve as platforms for cannon); Case of Edward Seymour, 8 State Trials 127, 12836 (Howell 1680) (applying funds to public purposes other than those
for which they had been appropriated).
6
8Case of Edward Fitzharris, 8 State Trials 223, 236-37 (Howell 1681).
See also J.Selden, Of the Judicature in Parliaments 6 (1690) (House
of Lords may proceed upon impeachment against any person for any
offense).
The 1681 resolution was part of a dispute, never entirely settled,
between the Commons and the Lords, over which classes of persons
were subject to trial by the Lords upon impeachment. See 2
Wooddeson at 601. Blackstone thought that a commoner could not be
impeached for a capital offense, but only for a "high misdemeanor" (a
crime against the state, not carrying the death penalty), while a peer
could be impeached for any crime. See 4 Blackstone at *259. Other
commentators took a different view of the restrictions on the scope of
impeachment of commoners. See case of Edward Fitzharris at 231-32
& n.t, 236 n.* (note by Howell); cf. 2 Wooddeson at 601&n.m.
69
Thomas Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary Practice v, vi, 113
(1857). Jefferson also gave the entire body of English rules as controlling in cases of impeachment conducted in the U.S. Congress. Id. at
112-17.
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not once held out as congruent with "high crimes
and misdemeanors."70 The view of some commentators" that "high crimes and misdemeanors" described
the entire range of impeachable offenses in England
is therefore unsustainable.7 2 What may have misled
commentators on this point is that the words "high
crimes and misdemeanors" were routinely used in
the official language of impeachment proceedingsarticles and pleadings-in the 17th and 18th centuries." But by then these words had become juris-

70

Wooddeson, whose Laws of England were widely quoted at
American impeachment trials (see, e.g., 8 Annals of Congress 2266,
2287, 2299 (1799)), also indicates clearly that impeachment lies for
offenses other than "high crimes and misdemeanors." 2 Wooddeson,
supra note 38, at 601, 606. James Fitzjames Stephen concludes that
"peers may be tried for any offence, and commoners for any offence
not being treason or felony upon an accusation or impeachment by
the House of Commons, which is the grand jury of the whole nation."
James Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law in England 146
(1883). None of these writers anywhere proposes "high crimes and
misdemeanors" as the standard for impeachment. Moreover, English
law dictionaries from the 18th and early 19th Centuries give "crimes
and misdemeanors" rather than "high crimes and misdemeanors" as
the standard for impeachment. See, e.g., Jacob's Law Dictionary (0.
Ruffhead & J. Morgan eds. 1773). Tomlins Law Dictionary (T.
Granger ed. 1836).
7
'See, e.g., Berger, note 10 above, at 67.
72
Berger has great difficulty reconciling the narrow scope of "high"
misdemeanors in Blackstone with the range of impeachable offenses
in English history. See Berger, note 10 above, at 61-62, 86, 89, 92. In
other writings Berger concludes 1) that "high crimes and misdemeanors" are words of art specifically describing impeachable offenses,
and meaning something other than "crimes and misdemeanors" modified by "high," and 2) that "nor were ordinary 'misdemeanors' a criterion for impeachments." Raoul Berger, The President, Congress, and
the Courts, 83 Yale L.J. 1111, 1145 (1974). Both conclusions are
dubious. On the former, see Clayton Roberts, The Law of
Impeachment in Stuart England: A Reply to Raoul Berger, 84 Yale
L.J. 1419 (1975). As to the latter, ordinary "misdemeanors" definitely
were a standard of impeachment, as demonstrated above.
73
See Alexander Simpson, A Treatise on Federal Impeachments 14390(1916).
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dictional formalities, incantations like "by force and
arms" in complaints for trespass before the King's
courts."
In America, where the history of impeachment
reaches back to the 17th century," "high crimes and
misdemeanors" were no more than in England the
standard for impeachment." There are definitions of
impeachable offenses in the pre-1787 constitutions
of nine of the 13 original states and Vermont. None
makes any mention of "high crimes and misdemeanors," and all contain one of the following formulations: "misbehaviour,"7 "maladministration,"7

74

See, e.g., 4 William. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England 5 n.c (R. Kerr ed. 1962) (note by Edward Christian, a late
18th century commentator): "When the words high crimes and misdemeanors are used in prosecutions for impeachment, the words high
crimes have no definite signification, but are used merely to give
greater solemnity to the charge." See Berger at 59 & n.20.
When a writ of assumpsit referred to a breach of contract "by force
and arms" no actual force or arms were involved. Similarly the incantatory "high" in articles of impeachment did not mean that an actual
"high" crime was at issue.
Before 1660 impeachments had in fact been brought in England without without even the allegation of "high crimes and misdemeanors" in
the articles of impeachment, on charges of being a "monopolist" and a
"patentee." See Case of Giles Mompesson, 2 State Trials 1119
(Howell 1620); Case of Francis Michell, id. at 1131 (Howell 1621).
There were also charges of "misdemeanors." See case of Samuel
Harsnet, id. at 1253 (Howell 1624) (ecclesiastical malfeasances). And
there were charges of "Misdemeanors, Misprisions, Offences, Crimes."
Case of the Duke of Buckingham, id. at 1267, 1308, 1310 (Howell
1626) (procuring officesfor himself "to the great discouragement of
others" and letting the navy deteriorate under his command); Case of
the Earl of Bristol, id. at 1267, 1281 (Howell 1626) ("Crimes,
Offences, and Contempts"). Some impeachments were brought on
charges that were not defined. See Simpson, note 71 above, at I15.
After 1660, when the words "high crimes and misdemeanors" commonly were added to articles of impeachment, the underlying charges
were frequently not "high." See note 67 above.
75
Article XVII of the Pennsylvania Charter of 1683 granted the
Assembly the power to impeach criminals. 2 Benjamin Poore, The
Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Organic
Laws of the United States 1529 (2d ed. 1878) [hereafter cited as
Poore]. In 1684 Nicholas Moore, the first Chief Justice of the
Provincial Court,was impeached under this provision. See W. Loyd,
The Early Courts of Pennsylvania 61 (1910).
76
As in England, no tribunal or commentator in America before 1787
ever used the words "high crimes and misdemeanors" as a comprehensive statement of impeachable offenses.
nNew Jersey Constitution article. XII (1776), reprinted in 2 Poore at
1312.
78
Pennsylvania Constitution section 22 (1776), reprinted in 2 Poore
at 1545; Vermont Constitution chapter II, section 20 (1777), 2 Poore
1863.
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"maladministration or other means by which the
safety of the State shall be endangered,""9 "mal and
corrupt conduct in ... office,""o or "misconduct and
maladministration in ... office.""

Despite the breadth of these provisions, impeachment retained the character of a criminal proceeding." The terms describing impeachable offenses in
18th century state constitutions ("misconduct in
office," "misbehaviour," "maladministration") may
not all sound like crimes to modern ears, but they
are in fact terms for various types of misdemeanors
treated as criminal offenses. Indeed, in the impeachment of Judge Hopkinson of Pennsylvania in 1780
the President of the Council viewed the conclusion
that "crimes only are causes of removal" as following
directly from the premise that judges hold office
"during good behaviour."8

Relation of Impeachable Offenses and Judges' "Good
Behaviour"
There is further confirmation, both textual and
prudential, of the true meaning of Article II, section
4, in the provision of Article III, section 1, concerning the tenure of judges.
Judges hold office "during good behaviour." These
three words serve both to give judges life tenure and

79

Virginia Constitution (1776), reprinted in 2 Poore at 1912. See
Delaware Constitution, article XXIII (1776), 1 Poore at 276-77;
North Carolina Constitution, article XXIII (1776), 2 Poore at 1413.
5
8 New York Constitution article XXXIII (1777), reprinted in 2 Poore
at 1337; South Carolina Constitution article XXIII (1778), 2 Poore
1624.
1
8 Massachusetts Constitution. Chapter 1, section 2, article VIII
(1780), reprinted in I Poore at 963, New Hampshire Constitution
(1784), 2 Poore 1286.
82The character of impeachment as a strictly criminal proceeding may
have been weakened in some early American practice, but not decisively. Article XVII of the Pennsylvania Charter of 1683 granted the
Assembly the power to impeach "criminals." 2 Poore 1529. That
power may have come to seem insufficient because the Charter of
1696 included the power to "impeach criminals or such persons as
they shall think fit to be there impeached." Id. at 1535. In the interim, in 1684, the Assembly had impeached Nicholas Moore, the first
Chief Justice of the Provincial Court. The articles of impeachment,
although formidable in appearance, contained allegations hardly more
serious than arbitrariness and arrogance. See W. Loyd, The Early
Courts of Pennsylvania 61 &n.1 (1910).
3
8 Pennsylvania State Trials 3, 56 (1780). The standard for impeachment in the Pennsylvania constitution of the time was "maladministration." See above.
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to indicate a standard for their removal. Article II,
section 4, for its part, applies to all civil officers.
There is no indication anywhere in the Constitution
that judges can be removed in any way other than
impeachment." If "treason, bribery, or other high
crimes and misdemeanors" in Article II, section 4,
describe the entire range of impeachable offenses,
then judges' "good behaviour" includes all conduct
short of "high crimes and misdemeanors." There is,
however, no such connection between judges' lapses
from "good behaviour" and the commission of "high
crimes and misdemeanors." "Good behaviour" is a
term of art that means, simply, to commit no crime.
"Misbehaviour" (and its close relative "misdemeanor") was a generic term at common law for
criminal misconduct." A federal judge can be
removed, therefore, for committing a crime and only
for committing a crime. At the Convention of 1787,
however, "high crimes and misdemeanors" were not
once held out as the test of impeachment and
removal of judges. This silence is echoed in the
Federalist, where Hamilton wrote that impeachment
is the only way to remove judges for "malconduct":
The precautions for their responsibility are comprised in the article respecting impeachments.
They are liable to be impeached for malconduct

by the House of Representatives and tried by the
Senate; and, if convicted, may be removed from
office and disqualified from holding any other.
This is the only provision on the point which is
consistent with the necessary independence of the
judicial character

Given this, if "high crimes and misdemeanors"" are
also the sole standard of impeachment, the tenure of

84

Deliberations at the Federal Convention indicate that judges are

removable only by impeachment. On August 27, 1787, the
Convention rejected a motion to make the judges removable "by the
Executive on the application <by> the Senate and House of
Representatives." 2 Farrand at 428-29.
85
In the impeachment of Judge Hopkinson of Pennsylvania in 1780
the President and Council, before whom the case was tried, asserted as
though self-evident: "[Judges] hold office during good behaviour. . ..
Crimes only are causes of removal." Pennsylvania State Trials 3, 56
(1780).
86
The Federalist No. 79, at 474 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
7
8 These are crimes against the state, remember.
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judges takes on a very peculiar tilt. Among other
problems, a judge who had committed murder could
not be removed from the bench."
The difficulty of reconciling judges' tenure during
"good behaviour" with the offenses enumerated in
Article II, section 4, disappears once the latter provision is understood as requiring the removal of officers who have committed "high crimes and misdemeanors" but not excluding their impeachment and
removal for "misbehaviour.""
Congressional practice in impeachments over the
years has been fully consistent with this understanding. Impeachment of judges has not been predicated
on their having committed "high crimes and misdemeanors."90
Similarly, Article II, section 1, of the
Constitution (concerning a President's incapacity)
makes dubious sense coupled with the conventional
understanding of Article II, section 4. Article II, section 1, provides that in the case of the President's
"inability" the office shall devolve upon the Vice
President. But nothing there indicates that there is
any mode of removal other than impeachment pro-

federal judge can be indicted, to be sure, but indictment and conviction in a court of law do not remove a judge from office. A judge
convicted of murder, imprisoned, and later released could therefore
return to the bench.
"The conventional understanding of Article II, section 4, by contrast, implies that there are two separate tracks of impeachment, one
for the "President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United
States" who commit "high crimes and misdemeanors" and another for
federal judges who depart from "good behaviour." The proponents of
the conventional view do not always appreciate this implication fully,
but it inheres in their view.
90
See the discussion of the Pickering impeachment on pp.28-29
below. Also, the articles of impeachment against Judge George W.
English in 1926 contained no allegation of "high crimes and misdemeanors." 67 Cong. Rec. 6283 (1926). The House went on to vote
overwhelmingly for articles of impeachment against English containing no allegations of "high crimes and misdemeanors. Id. at 6283-87.
Four of five articles of impeachment against Judge Harold Louderback
did not mention "high crimes and misdemeanors." Proceedings of the
United States Senate in the Trial of Impeachment of Harold
Louderback 825-31 (Gov't Printing Off. 1933). In 1936 Judge Halsted
Ritter was impeached by the House "for misbehavior and for high
crimes and misdemeanors," and convicted by the Senate on a general
charge of misbehavior. Proceedings of the United States Senate in the
Trial of Impeachment of Halsted L. Ritter 5, 637 (Gov't Printing Off.
1936).
88A
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ceedings. The apparent possibility of removal of a
President in the event of "inability" cuts against the
view of Article II, section 4, as a comprehensive
statement of grounds for impeachment."
The Understanding of Impeachment in the Period
1787-1803
There was considerable debate on impeachment
at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. A number of the delegates also had much to say on the
question in the period immediately following the
Convention and in the First Congress of 1789. Made
in the forensic heat of various moments, their utterances do not invariably cohere perfectly. 92 In all,
however, they add considerable weight to the exegesis of the impeachment provisions that I have
expounded here.
Among the delegates to the Convention were
proponents of broad and narrow impeachment powers. At an early session (June 2, 1787) the
Convention adopted the resolution of Hugh
Williamson that the executive be "removable on
impeachment & conviction of malpractice or
neglect of duty."" This clause, which evolved into
Article II, section 4, contains a standard of impeachable offenses. That may be why some commentators
see the same in Article II, section 4, today. But in
the course of the Convention Williamson's clause
became something different.
At a later session (July 20, 1787) the Convention,
after protracted debate, adopted Williamson's clause
for the draft which was sent to the Committee of
Detail. In the course of the debate on July 20, James
91

ln the First Congress Representative. Smith of South Carolina
pointed out that the Constitution "contemplates infirmity in the
Chief Magistrate; makes him removable by impeachment; and provides the Vice President to exercise the office, upon such a contingency taking place." 1 Annals of Congress 528 (1789) (running head:
"Gales & Seaton's History of Debates in Congress"). Smith was
doubtless referring to Article II, section 1; his understanding of the
clause is impossible unless he believed that the scope of impeachment
went beyond the terms of Article II, section 4.
92
Utterances made in the First Congress, though, may be entitled to
particular weight because 1) the framing of the Constitution was still
freshly in mind and 2) unlike the records of the Constitutional and
Ratifying Conventions (which are for the most part shorthand notes
transcribed years later) the Annals of Congress are verbatim transcripts of statements knowingly made in a public forum.
1 Farrand at 78-79, 88.
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Madison opposed Gouverneur Morris, who found
Williamson's terms too broad:
Mr. Govr. Morris admits corruption & some few
other offences to be such as ought to be impeachable; but thought the cases ought to be enumerated & defined:
Mr. <Madison>-thought it indispensable that
some provision should be made for defending the
Community agst the incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief Magistrate. The limitation of the
period of his service was not a sufficient security.
He might lose his capacity after his appointment.94
Neither incapacity nor negligence are "high crimes

and misdemeanors." Later in the debate, Morris
changed his mind, and moved closer to Madison's
view:
Mr. Govr. Morris's opinion had been changed by
the arguments used in the discussion ... .
Corrupting his electors, and incapacity were other
causes of impeachment."
The clause actually adopted on July 20 (by a vote of
8 to 2) provided that the executive was "removeable
on impeachment and conviction for malpractice and
neglect of duty.""6 If we are to view the current form

of Article II, section 4, as containing the whole of
the impeachment power, then the apparent consensus of July 20 simply melted away without a trace.
In the hands of the Committee of Detail,
Williamson's clause changed from one in which the
President is "removable" for "malpractice and
neglect of duty" to one in which he "shall be
removed" for "Treason (or) Bribery or Corruption."
This clause was further modified by the Committee
942 Farrand at 65.
95

Id. at 68-69.

962 Farrand 64, 69. Madison's notes summarize the question
put to a

vote as "Shall the Executive be removeable on impeachments?" Id. at
69.
97
The changes are reflected in the notes of a member of the
Committee:
He shall be (dismissed) removed from his Office on Impeachment
by the House of Representatives, and Conviction in the Supreme
(National) Court, of Treason (or) Bribery or Corruption.
Id. at 172. Farrand indicates that the parts in parentheses are crossed
out in the original. Id. at 163 n.17. The writing appears to be largely in
the hand of James Wilson. Id.
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of Eleven. The Senate was made the trier of
impeachments, and the only named offenses were
treason and bribery:
He shall be removed from his Office on impeachment by the House of Representatives, and conviction by the Senate, for Treason, or bribery ... .98
It takes considerable massaging of this clause as it
emerged from the two committees to read it as
describing the full range of impeachable offenses. To
that end the members of the two committees need
only have replaced "malpractice and neglect of duty"
by "treason or bribery" in the original Williamson
clause. To have also replaced "to be removable" by
"shall be removed" suggests an additional intention.
And, although an inadvertent change is conceivable,9 9 it would have been an extraordinary coincidence for the members of the two committees to
have adopted unwittingly the language of mandatory
removal and listed far graver offenses than before
without perceiving the changed meaning of the
clause before them. To have limited impeachment
to treason and bribery would be contrary to the earlier understanding of Madison and Morris on July
20, and would leave an incompetent or insane
President beyond the reach of Congress, as well as
one who had committed murder, highway robbery,
or embezzlement. Rather than put this near-nonsensical construction on the clause that emerged from
the Committee of Eleven, it seems obvious to take it
to mean what it says: if, on impeachment, the chief
executive is found guilty of treason or bribery, he
must be removed from office.
The clause from the Committee of Eleven was
debated in the Convention on September 8. Before
coming to a vote, it elicited the following exchange
between George Mason and James Madison:
Col. Mason. Why is the provision restrained to
Treason & bribery only? Treason as defined in the
Constitution will not reach many great and dangerous offences. Hastings is not guilty of Treason.
Attempts to subvert the Constitution may not be
98

1d. At 481, 497, 499.
"This change was not made in the heat of the moment. Six weeks
had elapsed between the referral to the Committee of Detail and the
return of the draft to the whole Convention.
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Treason as above defined-As bills of attainder
which have saved the British Constitution are forbidden, it is the more necessary to extend: the
power of impeachments. He movd. to add after
"bribery" "or maladministration." Mr. Gerry seconded himMr. Madison So vague a term will be equivalent to
a tenure during pleasure of the Senate ...
Col. Mason withdrew "maladministration" & substitutes "other high crimes & misdemeanors"
<agst. the State.>
On the question thus altered [passed 8 to 3].'"
Mason perhaps understood the provision before the
Convention as describing the full range of impeachable offenses,'"' although his remark by no means
forces that conclusion.' Nothing in Madison's

answer to Mason, however, suggests an understanding that departs from the precise terms of Article II,
section 4 .03 The point that so "vague" a term as
"maladministration" would be "equivalent to tenure
at the pleasure of the Senate" applies with perfectly
good sense to a clause governing mandatory
removal. If an impeachment were brought by the
House on any offense, the Senate could rationalize a
capricious removal by characterizing the offense as

maladministration and asserting a duty to remove
the President. The words subsequently proposed by
Mason, "high crimes and misdemeanors against the
State," leave the Senate less room for such maneu-

vers. A term can be too vague for inclusion in a list
of offenses for which removal by Senate is required,
while remaining a valid basis for Congress as a whole
to exercise discretion. It was Madison, remember,
who held out "incapacity" and "negligence" as
"indispensable" grounds of impeachment in the
debate of July 20.'0 Unless Madison had a complete
1I1d. at 550. The conventional understanding of Article 11, section 4,
isderived in large part from Mason's remark.
1oilf so, he was mistaken. Mason-who was militant on the question
of impeachment, but had been a member neither of the Committee of
Detail nor the Committee of Eleven-may have been expecting the
former Williamson clause concerning the offenses for which a
President was "removable."
iozMason's remark make good sense applied to a provision for mandatory removal.
3
,o Madison, unlike Mason, had been on the Committee of Eleven,
and was more than likely to have known the meaning of the clause
before the Convention.
2
'0See p. 7 above.
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change of view in the interim, he was objecting to
"maladministration" as a cause of mandatory
removal, not impeachment in general.'
There is a further clue in Madison's choice of
words on September that his concern was excessive
action by the Senate under a mandate to remove the
President rather than the scope of impeachment in
general. Madison remarked that "maladministration"
in this clause would be equivalent to tenure at the
pleasure of the Senate. The Senate by itself has the
removal power only. The impeachment power
belongs to the House of Representatives. In subsequent remarks on September 8, Madison asserted
that the House could impeach for "any act which
might be called a misdemesnor," a standard far from
congruent with "high crimes and misdemeanors
against the State."'" The Mason-Madison exchange
of September 8 does not imply, therefore, that the
Convention rejected "maladministration" as a standard for impeachment. Rather, the Convention
accepted "high crimes and misdemeanors against the
State" as a standard for mandatory removal, after
Madison questioned "maladministration" for such a
purpose.
A number of later assertions by Madison himself
confirm that he neither saw in "high crimes and misdemeanors" the full range of impeachable offenses
nor rejected "maladministration" as a ground for
impeachment. Speaking before the Virginia ratifying
convention Madison suggested that "if the President
be connected in any suspicious manner, with any
person, and there be grounds to believe he will shelter them, the House of Representatives can impeach
him; they can remove him if found guilty." 0 7 He

05

Note Madison's embrace of "maladministration" as a standard of
impeachment in the First Congress. See p.32 below.
106d. at 551. A similar point was made two months later by James
Wilson at the ratifying convention of Pennsylvania: "[Tihe Senate
stands controlled. . . . With regard to impeachments, the senate can
try none but such as will be brought before them by the house representatives." McMaster and Stone, Pennsylvania and the Federal
Constitution 313-338, quoted in 3 Farrand 161-162.
1073 Elliot at 498.
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later indicated that the President was impeachable
for "abuse of power."' On May 19, 1789, in the
debates of the First Congress on the Executive
Departments (in which were intermingled numerous
comments on the scope of impeachment), Madison
distinguished "high crimes and misdemeanors
against the United States" from impeachable offenses in general:
I think it absolutely necessary that the President
should have the power of removing from office; it
will make him in a peculiar manner, responsible
for their conduct, and subject him to impeachment himself, if he suffers them to perpetrate with
impunity high crimes or misdemeanors against the
United States, or neglects to superintend their
conduct, so as to check their excesses.1'
Later in the same debate, on June 16, Madison
asserted that the President "is impeachable for any
crime or misdemeanor before the Senate, at all
times."' Madison's most revealing remarks came on
June 17 when he suggested that the House could "at
any time" impeach and the Senate convict an
"unworthy man."'''' Madison further contended that
"the wanton removal of meritorious officers" was an
act of "maladministration" which would subject a
President "to impeachment and removal."l"2
Other standards proposed for impeachment in the
First Congress included "misdemeanors,"" "malconduct,"" 4 misbehavior,"' "displacing a worthy and
1ld. at 516. Among impeachable offenses held out by others at state
ratifying conventions were conduct exciting suspicion, see 2 Elliott at
45; "malconduct" and abuse of power, see id. at 168-69; making bad
treaties (James Wilson), see id. at 477, 4 id. at 125; an attempt by the
President to push a treaty through the Senate without a quorum being
present (John Rutledge), see id. at 268; behaving amiss, or betraying a
public trust (Charles Pinckney), id. at 281; "any misdemeanor in
office" by the President and giving false information to the Senate
(James Iredell), see id at 109, 127; abuse of trust "in any manner" by
the President (Richard Spaight), see id. at 114, 276; "any maladministration in his office" by the President, see id. at 47, 3 id. at 17; and
misbehavior (Governor Randolph of Virginia), see id. at 201.
Opinions closer to the conventional view of impeachment were
expressed as well in the state ratifying conventions. See 4 Elliot at 4849; id. at 113.
'"I Annals of Congress 387.
"Old. at 480.
'''Id.at 517.
2

11

1d.

Annals of Congress at 484, 493.
"Id. at 495.
"lId. at 493.
11 1
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able man,"". indolence,"' "neglect, "". and infirmi-

ty."' None of this misconduct was specifically identified as "high crimes and misdemeanors." In the
Federalist Hamilton nowhere mentions "high crimes

and misdemeanors."I 20
Several key questions on the scope of impeachment arose in the case of Judge John Pickering in
1803, the first impeachment under the Federal
Constitution to result in a conviction. 21 The most
important element in the Pickering case is the
Senate's rejection of "high crimes and misdemeanors" as the standard for impeachment and
removal. The case also bears on the range of possible
judgments in impeachment trials.
Pickering was impeached and convicted for
drunkenness. When the trial came down to a vote
on Pickering's guilt, Senator White, one of
Pickering's supporters in the Senate, attempted to
put the following question for judgment:
"'ld. at 504.
"lId. at 489.
"'Id. at 594.
9
" 1d. at 528.
120The Federalist No. 65 396-407 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A.
Hamilton).
...
The Pickering case was in fact the only impeachment trial before
1936 in which there was an actual finding of guilt from which can be
drawn inferences about the range of impeachable offenses.
The early federal impeachments also reveal that the conventional
view of the impeachment provisions has no greater seniority than the
interpretation I have proposed here. There is no systematic explanation or gloss of the impeachment provisions exactly contemporaneous
with the Constitutional Convention. In 1799, Representatives Bayard
and Harper, the managers of the impeachment trial of Senator Blount
(the first under the Federal Constitution) argued that the power to
impeach is granted to Congress in its established sense and that
Article II, section 4, merely compels the removal of officers found
guilty of the offenses specified there. 8 Annals of Congress 2251-53,
2298-99, 2301-04 (1799). Harper also insisted on the possibility of
lesser penalties than removal. Id. at 2302. Blount's defense (Dallas)
answered with what has become the conventional view of impeachment. Id. at 2263-67. The Blount case went off on the ground that a
Senator is not subject to impeachment for crimes committed in office,
see id. at 2318, leaving the other questions unresolved.
Both interpretations of the impeachment provisions were advanced in
the impeachment trial of Justice Samuel Chase in 1805. The defense
held out Article II, section 4, as an exhaustive definition of impeachable offenses. 14 Annals of Congress 432 (1805). The leading counsel
for the defense, Luther Martin, set the stage for a long tradition of
constitutional scholarship by quoting Article II, section 4, erroneously
in making his argument. Id. One of the managers of the impeachment
(Representative Rodney of Delaware) held out Article II, section 4, as
requiring removal for the specified offenses, stressing both the common law background of impeachment and the relation between the
possibility of lesser judgments and the command of Article II, section
4. Id. at 591-607.
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Is John Pickering, district judge of the district of
New Hampshire, guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors upon the charges contained in the article
of impeachment, or not guilty? 22
Senator Anderson proposed the following question:
Is John Pickering, etc., ... guilty as charged in the
article of impeachment exhibited against him by
the House of Representatives?z 3
Anderson's formulation was adopted by the
Senate,"' whereupon Senator White argued that to
find guilt on such a question, without declaring
"whether those acts amounted to high crimes and
misdemeanors," was to find that "high crimes and
misdemeanors" were not necessary for removal.'25
The Senate proceeded to find Pickering guilty in the
exact terms of Senator Anderson's question, by a
vote of 19 to 7.126
Having found Pickering guilty, the Senate passed
a judgment of removal by a separate vote of 20 to
6."' If no lesser sanction than removal were possible
this second vote would have been unnecessary.
Therefore the second vote both confirms the possibility of lesser judgments implied by Article 1, section 3, and, more importantly, underscores the true
meaning of Article II, section 4. Because Pickering
had not been convicted of "high crimes and misdemeanors," removal was not mandatory and the
Senate had to take separate action on the question.
THE SENSE OF IT
The overall scheme of impeachment in the
Constitution, based on its language and history, is
surprisingly clear considering the variety and confusion of scholarly opinion on the subject.
Impeachment lies for a broad range of crimes and,
when the crime aims at the state, removal from
office is mandatory upon conviction. When the
crime aims elsewhere, removal is also possible, but
not mandatory, and other penalties, such as censure
12213 Annals of Congress 364 (1803).
23
1 Id.
124Id.
1'1d.

at 364-65.

1261d. at 367.
13Id.
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or suspension from office, are available. The requirement of removal upon conviction of "high" crimes
against the state reflects the paramount concern of
the sovereignty to protect itself. The sovereignty in
question-the United States-was brand new in
1787, and still fragile. It is easy to see why the framers
took no chances with crimes harming the nation.
Because the range of impeachable crimes is broad,
impeachment is entirely sufficient to protect the public against wrongdoing by the President. Direct
action by the courts against the President is overkill.
There is no need for it, ever."' Indeed the impeachment provisions make considerably less sense if the
President is susceptible to compulsory judicial process
in addition to impeachment.
It is, therefore, a fair conclusion that subjecting a
sitting President to compulsory judicial process is
wrong as a matter of constitutional principle. What
the present imbroglio demonstrates as well is that it
is a terrible idea in practice wholly apart from that.
The public has no vital interest in having the
President subject to compulsory judicial process, and
nothing to fear from presidential immunity. In order
to carry out an illegal or criminal scheme, a President
must inevitably act through others whom the courts
can reach."' Should the President decide to rob a
2
1 1n the conventional view, by contrast, impeachment does not easily
reach such crimes as murder and arson. Since the conventional wisdom also has the President immune from indictment-albeit not from
other types of judicial action-it leaves the public defenseless, literally, against a President who kills a private person with malice aforethought.
129%is is the point made by Gouverneur Morris at the Constitutional
Convention, who thought originally that even the impeachment
6
power was unnecessary. See p. above.
The courts can, of course, act against anyone else in the executive
branch, in both criminal and civil cases, and do so on the basis of the
validity of the President's actions. The references that occasionally
surface in this debate to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952) (court order validly directed to Secretary of
Commerce), are therefore inapposite to the question of presidential
immunity. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, U.S. 681, - ("[Wlhen the
President takes official action, the Court has the authority to determine whether he has acted within the law. Perhaps the most dramatic
example of such a case isour holding that President Truman exceeded
his constitutional authority when he issued an order directing the
Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the
Nation's steel mills in order to avert a national catastrophe.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 96 L. Ed.
1153, 72 S. Ct. 863 (1952). Despite the serious impact of that decision on the ability of the Executive Branch to accomplish its assigned
mission, and the substantial time that the President must necessarily
have devoted to the matter as a result of judicial involvement, we
exercised our Article Ill jurisdiction to decide whether his official
conduct conformed to the law.").
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Seven-Eleven all by himself, impeachment would be
more than sufficient pending removal and further
prosecution, psychiatric treatment, or both. As for a
private lawsuit brought by a plaintiff with an axe to
grind,'30 there is no hazard to the Republic if the suit
is deferred until the President is out of office.
To appreciate fully the incoherence of the prevailing doctrines on these matters, consider that
under current law as widely understood the
President can be sued in tort, but not indicted, or
even impeached in some variants,"' for murder.
Immunity from judicial process does not place the
President above the law. The existence and breadth
of impeachment, as the participants in the
Constitutional Convention understood perfectly,
assure that the President is not above the law. What
is at issue is who delivers the law to which the
President is subject. In the original score, if we follow the tempo markings and phrasing faithfully, it is
the Congress, through impeachment, and not the
courts, that imposes the law on the President's person.
In fact, through all the public pieties about the
President's not being above the law, President
Clinton has been consistently below the law in this
affair. No one other than the President of the
United States would suffer these consequences for
having told a lie in a deposition, on a matter barely
relevant to the subject matter of a case that was in
any event dismissed. A lawsuit against the President,
however, brings out the ghouls. A self-appointed
operative made surreptitious recordings of a purported friend and fed them to the plaintiffs camp in the
suit. Imagine any other tort suit with so much
machinery mobilized to nail a defendant, and going
so far outside the subject matter of the suit. By itself
this demonstrates beyond peradventure why the
President ought not to be subject to routine judicial
process in a civil suit.
Another consequence of the President's exposure
to the judicial machinery in the Paula Jones caseand here the absurdity of the present situation is
fully revealed-is that a minimally -sufficient
impeachment is now possible as a technical matter.
Perjury is a crime, and hence potentially impeach30

1 0r an ex to grind if it's that kind of lawsuit.

"'Assuming that murder is understood as not being a "high" crime.
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able, even though the perjury alleged here would
probably not sustain a prosecution in a regular criminal court."' Because impeachable crimes, however,
are not congruent with crimes prosecutable in regular courts-they reflect the largely self-contained
jurisprudence of impeachment itself-impeachment
cannot be ruled out here at the threshold.
And since the possibility of impeachment has
now surfaced, albeit with a bare minimum legal basis
at most, the reader may indeed wonder what difference it makes whether the President is subject only
to impeachment or to judicial proceedings as well as
impeachment. What difference does it make, in
other words, whether the investigatory stage unfolds
in the courts or through the arm of Congress? But
this case in fact underscores the enormous difference
between the two regimes. If there is an impeachment here, it will be an impeachment wholly contingent on prior judicial proceedings against the
President. Without the initial action against the
President in the Paula Jones lawsuit, there would be
nothing to which an impeachment could possibly
attach.
Any wrongdoing here, and possible impeachment
for it, is simply an outgrowth of exposing a President
to compulsory judicial process, which the very existence and scope of impeachment render unnecessary
in the first place.
The perverseness of an impeachment of President
Clinton, if there is one, is the idiotic premise on
which it rests. The President wasn't forced to
respond to judicial process in the Paula Jones sexual
harassment suit because he committed a crime of
paramount public concern. That case, remember,
was dismissed as meritless. Rather, the President is
charged with wrongdoing now only because he had
to face compulsory legal process in that case. The
misconduct at issue here-giving a false deposition
in the Paula Jones case-has no independent significance. It is itself merely a byproduct of judicial
process directed at the President, essentially of a
sting set up in the courts. What we have here, in
32
1

First, it arose in a situation where people generally lie and I doubt

that there are many perjury convictions for lies of this type. Second,
because the underlying case was dismissed on the merits, the lie told

here may well not cross the high threshold of materiality that must be
shown to sustain a perjury conviction in a regular criminal proceeding.
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short, is an iatrogenic impeachment.'
Compare this with the Watergate affair, where
President Nixon was found to have obstructed justice in the investigation of serious crimes committed
while he was in office, those crimes being independent of the proceedings that Nixon had sought to
subvert.
It is illuminating, in fact, to replay Watergate and
the current misadventure in an imaginary world
where the President is not subject to judicial process.
The Watergate affair comes out much the same.
In that event, impeachment would have beenindeed was-entirely sufficient to the end of public
protection. With or without court orders directed
against President Nixon, there was ample subject
matter for impeachment, ample evidence, and ample
opportunity for Congress to develop that evidence
by compulsory process of its own.'
By contrast, in the current affair, where as far as I
can tell nothing of public consequence occurred,'
impeachment would never have gotten off the
ground. Indeed, there would be no public event at
all, because Paula Jones' lawsuit, if held off until
Clinton were out of office, would have attracted no
attention whatsoever in Congress."'
I can therefore say with some confidence that a
regime of presidential immunity, coupled with the
impeachment power viewed in its true light, would
33

' he reader doubtless knows what that is, but just in case, an "iatrogenic" disease is a disease itself caused by medical treatment, as when
you enter a hospital for tests and contract a staphylococcus infection
that you would not otherwise have suffered.
34
1 Congress can assert its own demands for information in connection
with impeachment proceedings, and act accordingly if the President
does not cooperate. Given that impeachment is inherently a criminal
proceeding, the tribunal (the Senate) can certainly take into account
a President's evasion or refusal to supply evidence. Indeed, refusal to
provide relevant evidence likely constitutes in itself a valid separate
count of impeachment.
The Independent Counsel statute expressly reserves to Congress the
full range of investigatory powers in impeachments: "An independent
counsel shall advise the House of Representatives of any substantial
and credible information which such independent counsel receives, in
carrying out the independent counsel's responsibilities under this
chapter, that may constitute grounds for an impeachment. Nothing in
this chapter or section 49 of this title shall prevent the Congress or
either House thereof from obtaining information in the course of an
impeachment proceeding." 28 USC 8595(c).
i35The Whitewater side of the special counsel's investigation has
aparently turned up nothing solid against the President.
And since the raison d'gtre of the Jones lawsuit was to hurt the
President politically, it might well not have been pursued at all after
Clinton left office.
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have brought a harmonious resolution to both of
these notorious episodes."'
A persistent bromide is that impeachments are
fatally subject to the vagaries of political passion. An
implied or express corollary is that judicial proceedings are not. Don't believe it. A lawsuit starts at the
caprice--or rapacity-of a plaintiff. Once under way
it is an infernal machine that for much of its course
is nearly impossible to stop. Compulsory legal
process can be mobilized without any degree of consensus. That makes it, when directed at the
President, a ready-made apparatus for political actors
and ideologues of all stripes.
Impeachment, for its part, cannot get started
without a substantial degree of consensus, and has
considerable procedural safeguards built into it. The
most fundamental safeguard against a runaway proceeding is that the congressional actors in an
impeachment are answerable to the public. The first
hint of restraint in this dismal affair resulted from
congressional players' testing the waters to see how
impeachment went over on the home front. The
congressional elections in the fall of 1998 further
slowed the momentum impeachment had derived
from earlier proceedings in court.
This is a healthy turn in my view, but much irreversible damage has been done. At the current pass
there is still no fully satisfactory outcome. There
should have been no Paula Jones lawsuit."' But there
was, and we might now have an impeachment based
on a foot fault."' For a conscientious Representative
or Senator there is no self-evident course at this
juncture. The nature of impeachment neither
invites nor bars further action. The least bad outcome, I think, is for impeachment talk to sputter
along for a while, then peter out. That is, mercifully,
a possibility because of the public's evident yearning
for the mess to go away. One mechanism of closure
might be for the President to suffer some kind of
37

I either of these two imaginary worlds, it goes without saying, a
In
special prosecutor could mobilize judicial process against all persons
involved in wrongdoing other than the President. In Watergate, that
would have been more than sufficient as a predicate of impeachment.
Many have forgotten that by the time the Supreme Court's order in
United States v. Nixon was issued, articles of impeachment had
already been voted by the House Judiciary Committee.
usNot while the President was in office, that is.
'"rhe President, thanks to the courts, was in a minefield at the time
of making it.
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censure, or other expression of congressional disapproval of false depositions."o
What can be drawn from this fiasco is a lesson for
the future: Don't set up the President to get entangled in proceedings in court. Consider the odds. The
cost to those players who may have to wait until the
President is out of office to make their move is likely
to be far smaller, on balance, than the cost to the
entire country in the obverse situation where the
President gets stupidly enmeshed in legal proceedings."' Particularly weighty in framing these odds is
the scope and flexibility of impeachment as an arm
against presidential misconduct. Various suggestions
that have surfaced in the accommodationist veinextending presidential immunity to civil but not
criminal actions and the like-are unpromising. The
President either is or is not subject to direct judicial
command. The Supreme Court could come up with
no grounded line of demarcation, natural or otherwise, between United States v. Nixon and Clinton
v. Jones.
Pending an epiphany that brings the courts to
reconsider the entire question of presidential immunity, practical advice for future Presidents is to master the finer points of Rule 37(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure."' Better to pay off litigants
with money, if the courts are bent on letting them
loose against Presidents, than to let them stake out a
mortgage on the nation.
4

1 oCensure is a possible outcome of an impeachment trial, see pp.1112 and note 34 above, but Congress can also express disapproval less
formally. Or, censure that the President did not contest could be
understood as a form of settlement of impeachment proceedings.
4
1 'In Clinton v. Jones, the Supreme Court suggested that "the availability of sanctions provides a significant deterrent to litigation directed at the President in his unofficial capacity for purposes of political
gain or harassment." 520 U.S. _.
Really? How much will sanctions
deter a judgment-proof ideologue?
4
' 2What President Clinton could have done, which would have been
both honorable and legally skillful, is to refuse to answer questions
about his recent sex life and accept the consequences under Rule
37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides sanctions for failure to answer questions in a deposition. In a lawsuit ultimately dismissed as meritless on summary judgment, any sanction
under Rule 37(b)(2) could hardly have been substantial. Better yet,
President Clinton could have refused to be deposed at all, again
accepting the consequences under Rule 37(b), thereby refusing to
acquiesce in the extension of judicial power implied by Clinton v.
Jones. In an ensuing showdown with the courts and Congress-not a
likelihood in any event-President Clinton, who could more than
plausibly have assumed the mantle of Defender of the Presidency,
would, I think, have had broad public support.
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It is hard to miss the palpable irony running
through the current situation. President Clinton's
supporters today include many from the cheering
section for United States v. Nixon in 1974. That the
instrument for delivering the coup de grce against
President Nixon has molted into a land mine on
which their champion Tripped left a number of
them shell-shocked. Still, the American legal academy is so judiciocentric that this nightmarish turn of
events has not yet elicited, in print at least, second
thoughts about United States v. Nixon from its early
fans.
CONCLUSION
The point of this excursion into the original
meaning of impeachment in the Constitution is
twofold. First, the impeachment provisions correctly
understood in their textual and historical setting are
more sensible than the view of impeachment
embodied in today's academic consensus. Second, in
light of the scope of impeachment, the case for the
President's entire immunity from judicial process is
compelling, if not overwhelming.
As the sole lever of public action against a sitting
President, impeachment discriminates perfectly well
between misconduct of paramount public concern
and matters less urgent. The command of Article II,
section 4, to remove civil officers guilty of treason,
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors,
protects the sovereignty from vital harm while leaving the Congress discretion to deal with other
wrongs. Exposure of the President to compulsory
judicial process as well is thoroughly redundant for
all but civil litigants who might have to wait (at
4
most 8 years) for their shot at suing the President. 1
That is a small sacrifice to ward off misadventures of
the sort we suffer through today.

preserve claims against the President, statutes of limitations
could be tolled during a President's tenure in office. To offset the cost
of deferral of claims, successful litigants could be awarded up to 8 years
of pre-judgment interest.
13To
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